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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many people do not know this, but the global community has 
created an international prisoner transfer regime that allows individuals 
who are incarcerated in foreign countries to transfer back to their home 
country to serve out the remainder of their sentences. The driving principle 
is that prisoners are more likely to be rehabilitated in their home country 
because of their familiarity with the language and culture and proximity to 
family and friends.  The regime is incorporated in many multilateral and 
bilateral treaties to which the United States is a party. The treaties never 
require that the country holding the prisoner transfer him or her back to 
their home country. Indeed, only candidates who demonstrate low levels 
of culpability for their crimes are considered good candidates for transfer. 
Additionally, prisoners who leave victims in their country of incarceration 
are considered especially poor candidates.   
However, the treaties do require the country holding the prisoner to 
notify that prisoner of his or her right to apply for transfer. In the federal 
prison system of the U.S, this is not a problem; almost all foreign nationals 
who are party to a prisoner transfer treaty with the U.S. are notified of 
their right to do so in a timely manner. However, in state prisons there is 
no such guarantee because the federal government of the U.S. does not 
require state compliance with these treaties. The argument essentially is 
that these prisoner transfer treaties are non-self executing and therefore 
cannot impose any obligations on the states within the U.S. without 
Congress implementing legislation requiring such compliance. The 
Congress has not done so. Wrapped up in this argument is the notion that 
the structure of our federated system precludes the federal government 
from encroaching on an area of governance so clearly within the sphere of 
state sovereignty as prisons. This is bad law and bad foreign policy. 
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This article will demonstrate that foreign nationals incarcerated in 
U.S. State prisons, who are nationals of countries that are parties to the 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons2 (hereinafter COE 
Convention), are able to assert their right to timely notification of their 
right to transfer. These rights come via the Ex parte Young doctrine3.  This 
article will analyze the judgments of the International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ICJ) in Germany v. United States (hereinafter LaGrand Case 
or LaGrand) 4 and Mexico v. United States (hereinafter Avena)5 to show 
that the Court’s analysis of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations6 
(hereinafter VCCR) to confer individual rights on foreign nationals should 
be followed to hold that international prisoner transfer treaties also confer 
rights on individuals. That is, if U.S. state courts interpreted the COE 
Convention in the same manner as the ICJ interpreted the VCCR, then 
U.S. state courts would find that the COE Convention is self-executing 
and therefore endow certain foreign nationals with justiciable rights of 
which the courts could enjoin enforcement.  
This paper asserts that the ICJ’s method of treaty interpretation is 
more appropriate than the ambiguous and inconsistent methods by which 
U.S. courts analyze the legal force of treaties in light of both international 
legal norms and the U.S. Constitution itself.  This argument has three main 
                                                 
2 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 25 U.S.T. 2867 (March 21, 1983), 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/112.htm [hereinafter 
COE Convention]. 
3 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
4 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm. 
5 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (March 31), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm. 
 
6 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April 
24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 262-512, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/consul.htm [hereinafter VCCR]. 
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components: 1) Federal courts should not distinguish between self-
executing and non self-executing treaties in determining the domestic 
enforceability of U.S. treaty obligations because such a distinction was not 
contemplated by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution; 2) Courts should 
interpret treaties from a contractual perspective and therefore the U.S. 
should not unilaterally determine whether it is bound by its own treaty 
obligations after the fact and 3) The increasing importance of international 
law in the modern world demands that the U.S. pay greater deference to 
the role of international law in our national legal system.  
Next, this paper will establish that the individual states of the U.S. 
have a history of non-compliance with international prisoner transfer 
treaties.  The repeated failure of the states to notify foreign nationals of 
their rights under the applicable prisoner transfer treaties is similar to that 
of Arizona’s failure to notify the LaGrand brothers of their rights under 
the VCCR. Because the rights of prisoners under our foreign treaties 
should not depend on whether they are in state or federal prison, foreign 
nationals in state custody who are not informed of their right to transfer 
should be able to enjoin state officials to assert that right and ensure future 
compliance. This argument stems from the fundamental premise, 
demonstrated in Part IV, that obligatory rights created under treaties are on 
par with federal law and thus should be enforceable by foreign nationals in 
U.S. federal courts.  This demonstration of U.S. compliance with its treaty 
obligations will not only galvanize adherence to constitutional authority in 
domestic courts, but will, more importantly, diminish the growing 
resentment of the U.S. abroad due to the U.S.’ history of treaty violations 
and the international community’s belief that the Bush Administration’s 
unilaterally invaded Iraq.  
 
Vol. 3 [2005]  DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY OF TREATY-BASED RIGHTS       26 
                                                       Louis Antonacci          
II. LAGRAND AND AVENA 
On June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice held in 
LaGrand that the VCCR confers on foreign nationals who are arrested and 
detained in the U.S. an individual right to be notified of their right to 
communicate with their local consulate regarding their criminal 
proceedings.7  The ICJ found that the U.S. had breached its obligation 
under the VCCR to inform the LaGrand brothers of their right to consular 
access.  The Court reaffirmed this decision in March 2004 in Avena, 
holding that the U.S. had violated the right of 51 Mexican nationals to be 
notified of their right to consular access.  The facts of LaGrand are 
extreme, and its unfortunate conclusion was the execution of Walter and 
Karl LaGrand despite a provisional order by the ICJ to stay their 
executions until further proceedings could determine the merits of 
Germany’s claim against the U.S. It should be noted that this article does 
not purport to comment on the fate of the LaGrand brothers. The 
“unfortunate conclusion” referred to is the failure of the U.S. government, 
in this case, to uphold a provisional order of the ICJ. 
A) FACTS OF LAGRAND 
Walter and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in 1962 and 1963, 
respectively.8 These two German nationals moved, with their mother, to 
the United States in 1963, and for the majority of their lives they had 
permanent residence in the United States. The LeGrands even became the 
adoptive children of a U.S. national.9 The LaGrand brothers were arrested 
on January 7, 1982, as suspects in a bank robbery in Marana, Arizona.  
During the commission of the robbery, a bank manager was murdered and 
                                                 
7 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104. 
8 Id. ¶ 13. 
9 Id. 
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another bank employee was seriously injured.10 The LaGrand brothers 
were subsequently tried in the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, 
where they were both convicted of murder in the first degree, attempted 
murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery and two counts of 
kidnapping.11 Both were sentenced to death on December 14, 1984.12 
The U.S. and Germany were parties to the multilateral Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol at all times 
relevant to these proceedings.13  The Optional Protocol to that Convention 
Article 36, paragraph 1(b) provides: 
"[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the 
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular 
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a 
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or 
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. 
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the 
person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be 
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said 
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay 
of his rights under this subparagraph."14  
 
The United States conceded that it had violated its obligations under this 
provision because the LaGrands were not notified of their right to 
communicate with their consulate.15 After two unsuccessful appeals with 
state-appointed counsel, the LaGrand brothers notified their consular post 
in June 1992.16 The LaGrand brothers did not learn of their rights under 
the Vienna convention from the Arizona authorities, but from some other 
                                                 
10 Id. ¶ 14. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 15. 
14 Id. (emphasis added). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. ¶ 18 – 22. 
 
Vol. 3 [2005]  DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY OF TREATY-BASED RIGHTS       28 
                                                       Louis Antonacci          
source.17 It was not until December 21, 1998, that the LaGrands were 
formally notified of their right to consular access by U.S. authorities.18 
 The LaGrands appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to set 
aside their death sentences on the grounds that the U.S. had failed to 
comply with Article 36 1(b) of the VCCR.19 The court rejected this claim 
on the grounds of the procedural default rule. The LaGrands had failed to 
raised the issue in state court and could not show cause or prejudice that 
precluded them from doing so on appeal.20  Karl LaGrand was executed 
on February 24, 1999.21 
 On March 2, 1999, Germany instituted proceedings against the 
United States in the ICJ requesting a provisional measure that would 
enjoin the United States and to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure 
that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these 
proceedings…”22 The ICJ granted Germany’s request and issued a 
provisional order to that effect the following day.23  Despite the 
provisional order, Walter LaGrand was executed later that same day.24 
 Germany brought several claims against the United States in the 
ICJ as a result of the United States’ violation of the Convention and its 
failure to comply with the provisional order.  The Court found that the 
VCCR had created an obligation on the U.S. to inform the LaGrand 
brothers of their right to consular access, and that the U.S. had breached 
                                                 
17 Id. ¶ 22. 
18 Id. ¶ 24. 
19 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 27-29. 
20 Id.   
21 See LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 29. 
22 Id. ¶ 30. 
23 Id. ¶ 34. 
24 Id. 
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that obligation by its failure to inform them of their rights within a 
reasonable time.  Subsequently, Mexico brought a claim against the U.S. 
alleging that the U.S. had similarly violated the rights of 52 of its nationals 
by failing to inform them of their rights under the VCCR.25  Again, the ICJ 
found that U.S. had violated the rights of the Mexican nationals by not 
informing them of their right to consular access pursuant to the VCCR.26  
This article will focus on the court’s interpretation of the VCCR so as to 
confer individual rights on foreign nationals.   
B) THE ICJ INTERPRETATION OF THE VCCR IN LAGRAND AND 
AVENA 
 
The ICJ specifically interpreted Article 36, paragraph 1 of the 
VCCR to create individual rights for foreign nationals of Member States 
who are arrested in other Member states.27 The court noted that the 
purpose of Article 36 is to determine the obligations that the State who is 
holding the foreign national has towards that prisoner due to nationality.28 
The court emphasized the final sentence of paragraph 1 (b): “The said 
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights 
under this subparagraph.”29 The ICJ also emphasized that Article 1 (c) 
precludes the sending State from providing consular assistance to the 
prisoner “if he expressly opposes such action.”30 The Court concluded 
that: “[t]he clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of 
                                                 
25 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (March 31). 
 
26 Id. 
 
27 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77; see also Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 40 (stating that “The Court would recall that, 
in the LaGrand case, it recognized that ‘Article 36, paragraph 1 [of the Vienna 
Convention] creates individual rights [for the national concerned]...’”). 
28 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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no doubt…[b]ased on the text of these provisions…Article 36, paragraph 
1, creates individual rights…[t]hese rights were violated in the present 
case.”31 
 The Court based its conclusion that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates 
individual rights on its reasoning that the context of the Article was to 
define the obligations that the sending State has toward the detainee and 
the receiving State, and on the text of the provision.32 The text is explicit: 
it provides that the sending state “shall inform” the prisoner of “his 
rights.”33 Logically, if the sending state is obligated to inform the prisoner 
of the substance of the provision, then it follows that the prisoner 
necessarily has a right to be so informed.34 
The ICJ interpreted the VCCR to confer an individual right on 
each foreign nationals even though the language of the preamble to the 
VCCR makes it clear that the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the 
Convention were not meant to benefit individuals.35 The preamble clearly 
states: 
The States Parties to the present Convention… Believing 
that an international convention on consular relations, 
privileges and immunities would also contribute to the 
development of friendly relations among nations, 
irrespective of their differing constitutional and social 
systems, Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and 
immunities is not to benefit individuals…36  
 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (emphasis added). 
 30 
 Vol. 3 [2005]               SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW                            31  
   www.scu.edu/scjil 
It could be argued that the preamble precludes any possibility of 
this treaty creating an enforceable individual right. The ICJ, however, 
chose to interpret Article 36 as to confer individual rights on foreign 
nationals despite the anticipation and dismissal of that possibility in the 
preamble. 
This disregard of hortatory language strikes at the very essence of 
the court’s reasoning.  The language of the preamble is not obligatory in 
nature.  Rather, this disclaimer of individual rights is cast in vague, 
hortatory language: “[b]elieving, …[r]ealizing…”37  The ICJ clearly chose 
to give greater weight to the obligatory language of Article 36(1) because 
the specific and unambiguous force of that Article evidences and imposes 
particular obligations upon the parties who agree to be bound by it, as 
opposed to ideals  to which they agree to aspire.  
Further, the ICJ in Avena specifically noted the universal 
applicability of its reasoning: 
To avoid any ambiguity, it should be made clear that, while 
the Court has stated concerns the Mexican nationals whose 
cases have been brought before it by Mexico, the Court has 
been addressing the issues of principle raised in the course 
of the present proceedings from the viewpoint of the 
general application of the Vienna Convention, and there 
can be no question of making an a contrario argument in 
any respect of the Court’s findings in the present 
Judgment.38 
 
While it is clear that the court is specifically referring to the VCCR 
in this passage, it is relevant to note that the ICJ explicitly addresses an 
issue of principle.  It is precisely this principle that suggests the Council of 
Europe Convention on the International Transfer of Prisoners also creates 
individual rights by virtue of the obligations it creates on receiving States. 
                                                 
37 Id. 
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III. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ALSO CREATES 
RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF OBLIGATIONS 
 
The ICJ’s analysis of the VCCR demonstrates that international 
prisoner transfer treaties also confer individual rights on foreign national 
detainees by virtue of the text and context of their relevant provisions.39 
The U.S. is a party to several multilateral and bilateral international 
prisoner treaties, though a comprehensive analysis of each would be far 
too cumbersome for the purposes of this article. This article will only 
analyze the language of the Council of Europe Convention (COE 
Convention), a multilateral treaty that has been ratified by 52 countries.40  
The analysis will demonstrate that the text of COE Convention confers an 
individual right on foreign nationals of member states detained in the U.S. 
for the same reasons that the ICJ determined that the VCCR did: the text 
of the COE Convention clearly creates a binding obligation on member 
States to inform foreign nationals of their rights under the treaty, and to 
process their applications in a timely fashion.  
The COE Convention and the VCCR both essentially impose an 
obligation on the states to give special consideration to foreign nationals 
who have become the object of their criminal justice systems. The primary 
objective of the COE Convention is to further the rehabilitation of the 
prisoner, while that of the VCCR is to “ensure the efficient performance of 
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States…”41  
                                                                                                                         
38 Avena, supra note 5, ¶ 151. 
39 See COE Convention, supra note 2, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/112.htm. 
40 See id. 
41 See VCCR, supra note 6, at preamble. 
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Recall that the ICJ did not allow the vague language of the preamble to the 
VCCR to undermine the obligations cast in Article 36.42 
The COE Convention, unlike the VCCR, expressly states that the 
rehabilitation of sentenced persons is in fact one of the primary objectives 
of the treaty: 
The member States of the Council of Europe and the other 
States, signatory hereto, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to 
achieve a greater unity between its members; Desirous of 
further developing international co-operation in the field of 
criminal law; Considering that such co-operation should 
further the ends of justice and the social rehabilitation of 
sentenced persons.43 
 
It is clear that this treaty has express humanitarian policy goals. 
Signatories to the agreement expressly agree to such goals, as opposed to 
signatories to the VCCR, expressly dismiss them.44 It follows then that if 
the VCCR can impute individual rights on foreign nationals, even though 
its preamble expressly states that the privileges that arise out of the treaty 
are not meant to benefit individuals, then surely the COE Convention, 
which was drafted with the expressed purpose of benefiting individual 
human beings, should at the very least lend itself to such an interpretation. 
However, the ICJ limited its interpretation of the VCCR to the ordinary 
meaning of the words chosen by the parties, only giving legal effect to the 
explicit obligations rather than to vague language beyond judicially 
manageable standards. 
 Article 36 of the VCCR and Article 4 of the COE Convention both 
describe the obligations that the State holding the prisoner has to the 
                                                 
42 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
43 See COE Convention, supra note 2, at preamble (emphasis added). 
44 Id. 
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prisoner and to the prisoner’s country of nationality.45 Article 4 of the 
COE Convention is titled “Obligation to furnish information.”46 Paragraph 
1 states that: “[a]ny sentenced person to whom this Convention may apply 
shall be informed by the sentencing State of this Convention.”47 Paragraph 
2 states in relevant part: “If the sentenced person has expressed an interest 
to the sentencing State in being transferred under this Convention, that 
State shall so inform the administering State…”48 The “obligation to 
furnish information” described in this Article is similar to the obligation 
imposed in Article 36 of the VCCR, which defines the duties that the 
sentencing State has to the detainee and his country of nationality.49 
Therefore, the context that the court emphasized in defining the individual 
right created by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is similar to that of 
Article 4 of the COE Convention and supports the argument that this 
Article also creates individual rights.50 
 It is clear that the obligations imposed on the sentencing State in 
Article 4 of the COE Convention create individual rights for foreign 
national detainees in light of the LaGrand holding.51 Article 4, paragraph 
1, orders that if the Convention applies to any detainee, then that detainee 
“shall be informed” by the State detaining him of his rights under that 
Convention.52 The use of the word “shall” is dispositive here: it clearly 
demonstrates a mandatory obligation on the receiving State by virtue of 
                                                 
45 See VCCR, supra note 6, at art. 36.  See also COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
46 See COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. (emphasis added). 
48 Id. (emphasis added). The “administering State” is that State of nationality of the 
prisoner. 
49 Id.; see also VCCR, supra note 6, at art. 36. 
50 See LaGrand, supra note 4, ¶ 77.  See also COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
51 See LaGrand, supra note 4, ¶ 77.  See also COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4. 
52 See COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4 (emphasis added). 
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the detainee’s status as a national of a foreign country who is a party to 
this Convention.53 Paragraph 2 of that Article demands that “If the 
sentenced person has expressed an interest…in being transferred…that 
State shall so inform the administering State…”54 The language here is 
just as clear, except here the obligation of the receiving State to inform the 
sending State is created as a result of the prisoner’s expressed request in 
applying for a transfer pursuant to this Convention. The texts of these 
provisions mirror those of Article 36 of the VCCR.55 
These two Articles create obligations on the sending State by use 
of a word that has no ambiguity attached to it, “shall.” The word “shall” 
unequivocally creates obligations. By the use of “shall”, it demonstrates 
that when one applies the reasoning of the ICJ in LaGrand, Article 4 of 
the COE Convention creates individual rights for foreign detainees.56  
Both the context and the specific language of these two provisions are 
unambiguous and identical in the types of obligations they impose in 
regard to foreign detainees, and should, therefore, be similarly construed.  
If one adopts the method of treaty interpretation employed by the ICJ in 
LaGrand, which construes the plain meaning of obligations expressly 
agreed upon by the parties to create a right in the beneficiary of such 
obligations, then the COE Convention creates the same right for foreign 
nationals of Member States serving determinate prison sentences in the 
U.S.  
 
 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at art. 4, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
55 See VCCR, supra note 6, at art. 36. 
56 See COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4 
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IV. TREATY OBLIGATIONS CAN CREATE DOMESTICALLY 
ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS 
 
The ICJ’s method of analyzing the VCCR to create rights where it 
unambiguously creates obligations is the proper way to analyze an 
agreement between sovereign nations.  The Constitution commands it by 
virtue of the Treaty Power57 and the Supremacy Clause.58 History provides 
ample support for a plain meaning interpretation of these provisions.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. courts have a confused and divergent history of 
determining the judicially enforceable rights and obligations created by 
treaties, limiting their enforceability by virtue of the federalist structure of 
our government and by applying distinctions such as “self-executing” and 
“non-self-executing” where they do not apply.   
It is the position of this article that domestic courts should interpret 
the obligatory terms of a treaty for what it is: a contract between sovereign 
nations.  If it is determined by the courts that the obligations created by the 
treaty are beyond the scope of the treaty power by virtue of its subject 
matter or other constitutional limitations, then such a treaty provision 
should be rendered unconstitutional for those reasons. A court should not, 
however, interpret the expressed obligations of treaties as judicially 
unenforceable because they are non-self-executing. This will serve to 
strengthen the role of international law in the U.S. and encourage other 
countries to follow suit, thereby creating a respect for international legal 
                                                 
57 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
58 See Id., at art. VI, cl. 2: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
 36 
 Vol. 3 [2005]               SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW                            37  
   www.scu.edu/scjil 
norms that the U.S. and the global community can rely upon as tangible 
and enforceable.  
This article has established that the COE Convention creates a 
right for foreign nationals of member states who are incarcerated in the 
U.S. to be notified of their right to apply for transfer to their home 
country.  Unfortunately, the individual U.S. states have a poor record of 
compliance with our international prisoner transfer treaties.59  Ronald 
Reagan signed the COE Convention on March 21, 1983, and it was fully 
ratified and deposited by the U.S. on March 11, 1985.60  On September 2, 
1997, the U.S. government sent a declaration to the Secretariat General of 
the Council of Europe who deposited it on September 3, 1997.61  Relevant 
parts of the declaration read: 
Under Article 3, paragraph 1(f), of the Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, both the sentencing and the 
administering States must agree to the transfer of a 
sentenced person. In the case of the United States of 
America, where a sentenced person has been convicted by 
a state of the United States of crimes under the laws of that 
state and is in the custody of authorities of that state, the 
Government of the United States will not agree to a 
transfer unless the competent state authorities first give 
their consent. 
 
In any such case, the state government must have state 
legislation authorizing consent to such transfers and be 
prepared to exercise that authority in the specific case… 
 
As just noted, however, even in those states that have such 
authority, specific consent of the appropriate state 
                                                 
59 See David S. Finkelstein, “Ever been in a [Foreign] Prison?”: The Implementation of 
Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties by U.S. States, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 153. 
(October 1997). 
60 See COE Convention, supra note 2. 
61 See Council of Europe, List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No. 112, at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=
30/01/05&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2003). 
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authorities would be required for transfer of any particular 
individual who was convicted of violating that state's laws. 
Consent may not be presumed from the existence of 
statutory authority; indeed, there are some states which 
authorize few, or no, transfers notwithstanding the 
statutory authority to consent. While the Government of 
the United States strongly encourages state participation in 
transfers under the Convention, the United States 
Government cannot compel a state to consent to the 
transfer of an individual who was convicted of violating 
that state's laws.62 
 
The U.S. has clearly conceded that it cannot compel state 
governments to comply with the terms of the agreement that it has signed 
and ratified.  It does not seem proper that a national government is 
powerless to enter into agreements with other sovereign nations that grant 
reciprocal rights to each other’s nationals in their respective countries and 
simultaneously bind its constituent bodies.  Such a stance diminishes the 
ability of other nations to rely on the U.S. as a contracting party and 
thereby provokes serious resentment towards the U.S, which in turn 
threatens the security of U.S. nationals abroad.  The enforceability of 
treaties that confer rights on foreign nationals in the U.S. should not be 
limited by the federalist structure of our republic if the treaties are 
otherwise constitutional, because such a limitation was contemplated and 
dismissed by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.  
A) CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND LIMITATIONS 
The Constitution of the U.S. plainly puts treaties made under the 
authority of the United States on par with federal legislation by virtue of 
the Supremacy Clause.63  Mr. Justice Butler properly interpreted this 
                                                 
62 See id., at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=
30/01/05&CL=ENG&VL=1 (emphasis added). 
63 See U.S. CONST.. art.VI, cl. 2. 
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simple provision in Asakura v. City of Seattle: “[t]he treaty-making power 
of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the 
Constitution, and, though it does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what 
the Constitution forbids,’ it does extend to all proper subjects of 
negotiation between our government and other nations.”64  The historical 
records of the ratification of the constitution make it clear that the Framers 
intended precisely this interpretation of the Treaty Power and the 
Supremacy Clause. 
The Articles of Confederation did not give the central government 
the ability to ensure state compliance with the treaty obligations of the 
national government, which was a principle reasons that the Framers 
decided to establish a new government under the Constitution rather than 
simply amend the Articles of Confederation.65  As James McHenry noted 
at the Federal Convention of 1787, “if a State acts against a foreign power 
contrary to the law of nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] 
cannot punish that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty.”66  John Jay 
also commented on the importance of centralizing the Treaty Power and 
imposing it on the individual states:  
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she 
observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to 
me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and 
punctually done by one national government than it could 
be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four 
individual confederacies.67   
 
                                                 
64 See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).  (internal quotation citing 
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)). 
65 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1103. (1992). 
66 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24-25 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
67 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 14-15 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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James Madison expressed similar sentiments, “[i]f we are to be one nation 
in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”68  These 
comments by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution make it clear that they 
realized the importance of the ability of the federal government to speak 
with one voice.  The States had been undermining the U.S.’s ability to 
effectively manage its foreign affairs and it was clear that we would be 
unable to promote international comity if other nations could not rely on it 
to make agreements that would bind its constituent bodies.69  
As Carlos Manuel Vazquez noted in his article, Treaty-Based 
Rights and Remedies of Individuals: 
[t]he Framers corrected this problem with respect to treaties 
in exactly the same way they corrected it with respect to the 
statutes of the Union and the Constitution itself: they 
declared all three to be the supreme Law of the Land, and 
accordingly operative directly on individuals and 
enforceable in the courts.70   
 
Clearly the Framers intended that the U.S’ international treaties be on par 
with federal legislation and binding on state governments.  Mr. Justice 
Sutherland articulated the proper reading of the treaty power in U.S. v. 
Belmont, “state constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to 
the inquiry and decision.  It is inconceivable that any of them can be 
interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal 
constitutional power.”71 
                                                 
68 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
69 See Vazquez, supra note 65, at 1103. Prof. Vasquez gives some examples of problems 
the U.S. was having while concluding a commercial treaty with Great Britain because of 
previous state noncompliance with other treaties. 
70 Id. at 1104 (internal quotations omitted). 
71 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937). 
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The treaty power is inherently limited by the Constitution, and thus 
no treaty can be made that would be repugnant to its terms and spirit.72  
For example, a treaty could not be made that would criminalize certain 
acts in the United States because federal criminal statutes can only be 
legislated with the consent of Congress. Thus such a treaty provision 
would be patently inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution.  There is 
also an inherent subject matter limitation on the scope of the treaty power, 
and the power of the federal government to bind the states by its treaty 
obligations should not be expanded beyond the proper objects of foreign 
relations.73  This distinction is not easily demarcated with a bright-line 
rule, but it is certainly within the capacity of federal courts to determine if 
a treaty addresses the proper subject matter when asked to rule on its 
enforceability.  An example in which the federal government is acting 
beyond its proper scope of power to bind the states would be one that 
required certain curriculum in public education in the U.S. and other 
                                                 
72 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see also, Charles A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 413 (November, 1998).  
Bradley notes that the records of the Virginia Ratifying Convention make it clear that the 
Framers did intend there to be limits on the treaty power, but those limits were essentially 
that the delegation be the proper object of a treaty, i.e., the subject matter of treaties 
should be germane to foreign affairs.  The author does not wish to distort the treaty power 
or the foreign commerce clause in the same way that the interstate commerce clause has 
been so manipulated, but surely a treaty regarding the rights of foreign nationals who are 
prisoners of U.S. federal or state correctional systems is the proper object of such an 
agreement. 
73 Robert Anderson makes a strong argument against this approach of a “subject matter” 
limitation on the treaty power.  He argues that because two nations have decided to 
contract about an issue necessarily makes that issue one of international concern and 
therefore the proper subject matter of a treaty.  This argument is based on the notion that 
the treaty power creates a right to contract for the federal government, and therefore 
whatever the federal government chooses to contract on is necessarily a matter of 
international concern if there is another sovereign nation who wishes to bargain on that 
issue.  See Robert Anderson “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the 
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution. 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189 (2001).  
The author agrees that one should take a “contract” approach to interpreting the terms of 
a treaty, see infra Part IV.B.1, but takes the position that there is a subject matter 
limitation on the treaty power that is beyond the Executive’s ability to find a contracting 
partner. 
 
Vol. 3 [2005]  DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY OF TREATY-BASED RIGHTS       42 
                                                       Louis Antonacci          
contracting states.  Clearly such a treaty operates with domestic and 
international effect, and while one could argue that such a treaty may 
benefit foreign relations for a variety of reasons, the severity of its impact 
on domestic affairs is disproportionate to its germaneness to foreign 
affairs.  Put another way, the relationship between the object of the treaty 
(domestic public school curriculum) and the proper subject matter of such 
an agreement (foreign affairs) is far too tenuous to be persuasive and 
therefore constitutional.   
The Supreme Court similarly analyzed the interstate commerce 
clause74 in U.S. v Morrison in the same manner and found that the 
relationship of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) with interstate 
commerce was deemed too attenuated to justify the Congressional basis 
for the Act and its constitutionality.75  Similarly, the treaty power should 
not be construed too broadly so as to dilute its enforceability and integrity, 
but what is most relevant here is the assertion of the judicial capacity to 
make such a determination: “[w]hether particular operations affect 
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of 
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative 
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.”76  Domestic courts 
should assert the same ability in determining the scope of the treaty power.  
If a treaty creates rights that are the proper objects of a treaty and 
not inconsistent with the Constitution, then it is clear, from the above, that 
our Framers intended those rights to be binding on the States.  The 
Framers expressed the importance of the ability of the United States to 
speak with one voice in its relations with foreign nations, and thus the 
                                                 
74 See U.S. CONST. art.I., § 8 ,cl. 3. 
75 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).  
76 Id. at 614.  
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power of the Executive and the Senate to treaty with foreign nations to 
bind the several States was deemed indispensable to the ability of the new 
nation to effectively manage foreign affairs. The nation’s incorporating 
document should not be perverted to diminish the value of the above 
perspective simply because the U.S. is an infinitely more powerful nation 
in 2004 than it was in 1787. 
B) OBLIGATORY TERMS OF TREATIES ARE NECESSARILY 
SELF-EXECUTING 
 
Treaties that create obligations on states to act or not to act in 
certain ways toward nationals of contracting states necessarily create a 
right for those nationals within constitutional limits.  This sort of treaty is 
“self-executing” to the extent that it creates those rights.  In order to 
determine whether a treaty creates obligations on the contracting parties, 
one must look to the language of the treaty itself rather than rely on the 
supposed “intent” of one party to the agreement. If one party allows its 
unilateral intent to supersede the agreed-upon text of the agreement, then it 
will discourage other nations from negotiating with them, as well as 
encourage other nations to derogate from the terms of existing and future 
treaties with them. If the language of the treaty is hortatory as opposed to 
obligatory, then the treaty cannot have legal force in domestic courts 
without implementing legislation.77 
                                                 
77 See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) at 2551-
52: “…[g]eneral humanitarian intent cannot impose uncontemplated obligations on treaty 
signatories.”  
The effect of a treaty can, of course, be the basis for an act of Congress.  Under Article I, 
Section 8, clause 18 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has power to “make all the laws 
which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution, and all other powers vested 
by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.”  Congress can therefore enact legislation that is necessary to carry out 
the aspirations of a treaty that is properly made.  Hortatory language in treaties therefore 
offers more flexibility to nations in deciding how far they want to go in carrying out the 
express goals of treaties.  Considering this distinction in the treaty-making process makes 
it appear all the more as if a country that tries to characterize a treaty cast in obligatory 
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The Restatement of Foreign Relations Third has expressly 
recognized the inherently self-executing nature of treaty obligations.78  
One might think that the majority of the ICJ in LaGrand wrote Reporter’s 
note 5 of section 111: “Provisions in treaties of friendship, commerce, and 
navigation, or other agreements conferring rights on foreign nationals, 
especially in matters ordinarily governed by State law, have been given 
effect without any implementing legislation, their self-executing character 
assumed without discussion.”79  Indeed, the ICJ expressly construed a 
right for the LaGrand brothers out of the obligatory language of the 
VCCR.80  In U.S. v. Rauscher,81 the Supreme Court characterized the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals’ opinion as “very able” when it said: 
When it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be 
done, or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be 
disregarded or exceeded by the contracting parties, the 
compact does not need to be supplemented by legislative or 
executive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline 
to override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed 
restrictions, for the palpable all-sufficient reason, that to do 
so would not only violate the public faith, but to transgress 
the ‘supreme law of the land’.82   
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the self-executing 
character of treaty-made obligations in Asakura v. Seattle, stating that no 
municipal ordinance or state law can interfere with the obligations of the 
                                                                                                                         
language as somehow “non-self-executing” is, in fact, trying to alter the terms of the 
agreement ex post. 
78 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §111, reporter’s note 5 (1987) 
(stating that “[o]bligations not to act, or to act only subject to limitations, are generally 
self-executing.”). 
79 Id. (emphasis added). 
80 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
81 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886). 
82 Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878) (emphasis added). 
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U.S. under its treaties.83  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(hereinafter Vienna Convention) instructs us similarly.84  Articles 26 and 
27 make it clear that: 1) all treaties in force are binding; 2) treaties in force 
must be observed in good faith; and 3) States may not invoke provisions 
of its internal law as an excuse not to perform its treaty obligations.85  This 
seems quite contrary to the position that the U.S took in its declaration to 
the COE Convention.86 
The relevant authority makes it clear that when one is interpreting 
the terms of a treaty to determine if the treaty creates judicially 
enforceable rights, the first inquiry must be to the language of the treaty 
itself.87  If sovereigns agree to obligations to act or not to act towards 
individuals in a particular manner, then those individuals necessarily have 
the right to be treated in such a way.  Once it is determined that an 
individual has a right under a treaty, the question then turns on whether 
this is a judicially enforceable right, and then whether there is a remedy.  
Domestic courts are reluctant to enforce treaty-based rights.88 
                                                 
83 See Asakura, supra note 64, at 341: 
The treaty is binding on the State of Washington…  The rule of equality 
established by it cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of the United States by 
municipal ordinances or state laws.  It stands on the same footing as supremacy 
as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States.  It 
operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will 
be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts. 
84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/ 27, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm. 
85 Id. at art. 26-27. 
86 See supra note 61.  
87 Vazquez notes that hortatory treaty provisions could be argued to be obligatory in the 
sense that the contracting parties have an obligation to act in good faith to comply with 
those aspirations.  He also notes, and the author agrees, that “obligations of this nature do 
not give rise to correlative legal rights.”  Nations have a right to expound their mutual 
ideologies for political reasons, or any reason at all, without fear of later being legally 
bound by them.  See Vazquez, supra note 65, at 1123.   
88 Id. at 1082-1083. 
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C) JUDICIALLY CREATED OBSTACLES: “SELF-EXECUTING” 
VERSUS “NON-SELF-EXECUTING” TREATIES  
 
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has rightly described the “self-
executing treaty” concept as “the most confounding [doctrine] in treaty 
law.”89  The doctrine itself seemingly is used by the courts as another 
political question, and as one author has examined in detail, the two 
categories of non self-executing treaties correspond with the two 
categories of political questions.90  Viewed in this light, it is clear that 
courts attempt to interpret treaty obligations the same way that they do 
constitutional and statutory provisions.  This is why courts try to look at 
the intent of treaty-drafters to determine whether the treaty is “self-
executing.” A treaty, however, is much more akin to a contract than it is to 
legislation because it is an agreement between two sovereigns who agree 
on bargained-for terms rather than a unilateral assertion of authority 
granted by the populous.  Treaties should, therefore, be interpreted as 
contracts, not legislation.  In light of this, it is inappropriate to look at the 
“intent” of the treaty drafters when interpreting the language of a treaty 
                                                 
89 U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876 (1979). 
90 Vazquez parallels “hortatory” treaty provisions to those statutory or constitutional 
provisions which do not afford judicially manageable standards, and are therefore 
unenforceable by the courts.  He also parallels “executory” treaty provisions to legislation 
that delegates rule-making authority to an administrative agency.  His conclusion is best 
quoted: 
I do not here advocate any particular version of the political-question doctrine, 
nor do I contend that it provides an independent ground for refusing to enforce 
treaties that do not fit the first two categories of unenforceable treaty provisions 
described above.  But I do propose that the parallels between the political 
question doctrine and the doctrine of self-executing treaties be recognized and 
that the tension between the latter doctrine and the status of treaties as “law” be 
resolved, as it is generally with constitutional provisions, not by denying the 
provision’s status as law, but by determining whether there are overriding 
reasons to hold that what is prima facie a “law” is nevertheless unenforceable 
in the courts. 
See Vazquez, supra note 65, at 1120 - 1132 (emphasis added). 
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because, like all parties to a contract, each party is necessarily acting in 
their own self-interest. A look into the history of international prisoner 
transfer treaties will illustrate why U.S. courts should, as the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs, adopt a parol evidence rule 
for treaty interpretation:91 the person interpreting the treaty must confine 
their interpretation to the text of the document itself unless the text is 
ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result, in which case they may turn 
to extrinsic evidence.  
Turning to the constitutional limits of the treaty power, the 
Supremacy Clause says nothing about requiring implementing legislation 
in order to give force to treaties ratified by the Senate.92  However, 
domestic courts seem to interpret obligatory treaty provisions under the 
assumption that they cannot be given legal force unless the Executive has 
manifested some subjective intent to the contrary.93  The Constitution, 
however, commands that the inquiry be to the contrary: a treaty that is 
obligatory in nature should be presumed to be self-executing unless it 
expressly requires implementing legislation.  If a claim is brought under 
an obligatory treaty-provision which is beyond the scope of the treaty 
power, it would then be proper for domestic courts to declare it 
unenforceable because of its unconstitutionality rather than it being non-
self-executing.  
 
 
1. Treaties Are Contracts 
                                                 
91 See supra note 84.  
92 See supra note 58.  
93 See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir.1982); see also Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993); see also Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Huddleston, 
113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993). 
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The fundamental cause of confusion within the courts in 
determining the domestic legal effects created by treaties is the courts’ 
tendency to interpret treaty provisions as they would legislation. 
Accordingly, they are quick to turn to the travaux preparatoires of a treaty 
to determine whether it is self-executing even when the plain text of the 
treaty is express.  However, the nature of the treaty itself and the dynamics 
of the treaty-making process are much more akin to that of an international 
contract, and its provisions should be interpreted accordingly. 
The simplest way to compare and contrast the nature of treaties 
versus legislation is to examine their respective definitions.94  The 
definition of legislation is “the exercise of the power and function of 
making rules (as laws) that have the force of authority by virtue of their 
promulgation by an official organ of a state or other organization.”95  Such 
                                                 
94 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, at  http://www.m-w.com/.  (last visited March 5, 
2003). Full entries read: 
leg·is·la·tion 
1. the action of legislating; specifically : the exercise of the power and function of 
making rules (as laws) that have the force of authority by virtue of their 
promulgation by an official organ of a state or other organization 
2. the enactments of a legislator or a legislative body 
3  a matter of business for or under consideration by a legislative body 
trea·ty 
1. The action of treating and esp. of negotiating  
2.  An agreement or arrangement made by negotiation: as  
a. private treaty  
b. A contract in writing between two or more political authorities (as states or 
sovereigns) formally signed by representatives duly authorized and usually 
ratified by the lawmaking authority of the state (the president…shall have 
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties - U.S. 
Constitution art. II) compare executive agreement 
3.  A document embodying a negotiated agreement or contract  
4.  An agreement or contract (as between companies) providing for treaty reinsurance 
95 Id. 
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an act is unilateral. Because the person or body legislating is unilaterally 
creating law, in their official capacity, with the supposed authority to do 
so, their intent is important in determining the meaning of ambiguous 
provisions of law.  Unlike a treaty, a piece of legislation is not an 
agreement between parties. Legislation derives its power from the 
authority of the law-making body to issue it, and while it may constitute a 
compromise between divergent interests within that body, legislation 
affects only the governed, which has given the legislator authority to 
create laws without the specific consent of the governed. The governed, of 
course, have the power to remove the legislator and replace him or her 
with one who will better represent their interests. Parties to a treaty, like a 
contract, negotiate every term of the agreement whose four corners 
represent the scope of its power over their future actions. 
The essence of a treaty as a negotiated instrument is clear from its 
definition.96  The Merriam-Webster Legal Dictionary, in fact, offers one 
definition of a treaty as “a contract in writing between two or more 
political authorities.”97  Because a treaty is an agreement between two or 
more parties, the intentions alone of the separate parties will not determine 
how the provisions of their agreement should be interpreted.  However, 
U.S. courts have a tendency to look at the individual “intent” of the U.S. 
treaty-drafters in determining whether an obligatory provision should be 
deemed “self-executing” and therefore have any domestic legal effect.  
This approach of looking at the intent of an individual party in entering 
into a contract, when the plain language of the contract admits of no 
ambiguity, in order to determine the enforceability of that contract, is 
clearly at odds with fundamental principles of equity.   
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id (emphasis added). 
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Surely other nations should be able to rely on the obligations that 
the U.S. assumes in its treaties without having to worry about a potential 
unilateral defense that courts can create by examining the supposed 
“intent” of the American treaty drafters.  If the perceived reliability of the 
U.S. to adhere to treaty obligations continues to deteriorate while U.S. 
courts fail to enforce those obligations domestically, then other treaty 
parties may feel compelled to rely on alternative enforcement methods.  
As in the domestic context, the manifestations of these results are 
unpredictable and, therefore, undesirable. 
2. International Law Supports Contract Interpretation 
Method 
 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
instructs the judicial organ interpreting a treaty to adopt the ordinary 
meaning of the terms  within the treaty. 98  Only when the text of the treaty 
is either obscure, ambiguous or leads to a result, which is patently 
unreasonable, may the interpreting body look to supplementary means.99 
Section 325 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations acknowledges this as 
the internationally recognized and accepted method of interpreting an 
international agreement. “An international agreement is to be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its 
terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”100  The 
comments to this section of the Restatement make it clear that the 
tendency of U.S. courts to resort to travaux preparatoires in interpreting 
                                                 
98 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at art. 31.  
99 Id. at art. 32.  
100 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 78, §325 (1). 
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international agreements is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention.101  
Such a method of interpretation could be argued as a breach of 
international law itself, but that is outside the scope of this article.102  
What is important to notice here is that the Vienna Convention makes no 
mention of the subjective “intent” of the treaty drafters when discussing 
the proper mode of interpreting international agreements.  Appropriately, 
the Restatement makes no mention of it either.   
However, when one turns to section 111 of the Restatement, one is 
surprised to discover that the subjective intent of the United States is the 
determining factor in whether a treaty is self-executing and ultimately if 
its terms are enforceable in domestic courts.103  Section 111 begins by 
reiterating the Supremacy Clause, asserting that international agreements 
of the U.S. are supreme law in the U.S. and dominant over the several 
states.104  Subsection (3) goes on to say that the U.S. courts are to give 
effect to the international agreements of the U.S. unless they are “non-self-
executing.”105  Subsection (4) then provides three factors, each of which 
will fatally render a treaty “non-self-executing.”106  The first of these 
                                                 
101 Id. cmts. e-f.  The travaux preparatoires (French for “preparatory works”) are the 
explanatory documents and requests submitted by the potential parties to the treaty 
commission during the treaty-drafting process. 
102 Though the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is has arguably become 
binding on all Nations as customary international law.  See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP 
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 2001-2002 EDITION (Aspen 
Law & Business 2001). 
103 Supra note 78, § 111 cmt. h.  
104 “International law and international agreements of the United States are law of the 
United States and supreme over the law of the several states.”  Id. § 111(1). 
105 “Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to 
international agreements of the United States, except that a “non-self-executing” 
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”  
Id. § 111(3). 
106 The three factors are: 
(a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as 
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation, 
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factors seems to be the source of the “subjective intent” analysis:  “if the 
agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as 
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation.”107 
How the subjective intent of the U.S. treaty-drafters is related to 
subsection (4)(a) is not clear. To say that an “agreement” must “manifest 
an intention” is not instructive to an analysis of the subjective intent of the 
treaty-drafter.  Even from the plain language, analyzing it from a 
grammatical standpoint, the word “agreement” is the subject of the verb 
“manifest,” which takes the noun “intention” as its direct object.  The 
“agreement” referred to in subsection (4) (a) is presumably the 
“international agreement” that begins the subsection. The treaty is the 
subject of the sentence and is performing the action of the verb.  The 
subject of a transitive verb must perform some action upon the verb’s 
object.  A treaty can only “manifest” an “intention” in one way: by 
expression in written words.  Assuming subsections (b) and (c) are met,108 
the inquiry as to whether a treaty is self-executing under sub (a) simple: if 
the treaty does not expressly provide for implementing legislation, then 
none should be required to give it legal effect.109  It is important to note 
the presumption of self-execution expressed in section 111 by looking at it 
as a whole: subsection (1) says that international law is supreme law of the 
                                                                                                                         
(b) if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires 
implementing legislation, or 
(c) if implementing legislation is constitutionally required.  
Id. § 111(4). 
107 Id. § 111(4)(a). 
108 Subsection (b) implicates the “later-in-time” rule by addressing a Congressional 
resolution, but this issue has been explored extensively by other authors.  See Detlev F. 
Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach. 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
313, 313-324 (April, 2001).  For a discussion of the implications of subsection (c), see 
infra Part IV.A. 
109 Supra note 78, § 111(4)(a). 
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land; subsection (2) says that cases arising under international law are 
within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts; subsection (3) says that courts are 
bound by our international agreements unless those agreements are non-
self-executing; and subsection (4) delineates the three factors used to 
determine whether a treaty is non-self-executing.110  Section 111 makes 
non-self-executing treaties the exception rather than the rule, so domestic 
courts should evaluate obligatory treaty provisions as prima facie self-
executing.  But comment (h) to Section 111 is very clear about what the 
drafters of the Restatement meant by an agreement “manifesting an 
intention”: 
In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the 
United States to decide how it will carry out its 
international obligations.  Accordingly, the intention of the 
United States determines whether an agreement is to be 
self-executing in the United States…  If the international 
agreement is silent as to its self-executing character and 
the intention of the United States is unclear, account must 
be taken of any statement by the President in concluding 
the agreement… Whether an agreement is or is not self-
executing in the law of another state party to the agreement 
is not controlling for the United States.111 
 
It is difficult to determine what about this comment is most perplexing: the 
fact that it contradicts and undermines the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, general principles of equity, or the Restatement itself.112 
                                                 
110 See supra note 78 at § 111. 
111 Id. cmt. h (emphasis added).  This comment is titled: “Self-executing and non-self-
executing agreements.” 
112 It is important to note that while the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, as of 
September 2000, 90 other countries had.  Therefore, the Vienna Convention is the most 
persuasive authority on the international legal norms for the interpretation of international 
agreements in existence today, notwithstanding the failure of the U.S. to ratify it.  See 
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 
2001-2002 EDITION (Aspen Law & Business 2001). 
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Comment (h) expressly contradicts the section on which it purports 
to comment.113  The plain language of section 111 clearly creates a 
presumption in favor of finding a treaty self-executing in absence of a 
manifest intention otherwise.  However, this comment reverses that 
presumption because it explains that if a treaty is “silent as to its self-
executing character,” then the interpreting body must analyze the intention 
of the Executive or the Senate.114  The comment exacerbates this deviation 
from its own rule by explicitly expressing that the intention of the U.S. is 
dispositive in determining whether a treaty is self-executing. 
This inconsistency is nothing more than a microcosm of how 
domestic courts have been avoiding the enforceability of treaty provisions.  
This inconsistency between section 111 and the comment to this section 
demonstrates the current state of domestic affairs: domestic courts are 
generally in violation of both international and domestic law with regards 
to domestically enforcing international agreements by using subjective 
intent to determine whether an obligatory treaty provision is enforceable.  
An examination of the history of international prisoner transfer 
treaties will serve to illustrate why the intention of the parties entering into 
a treaty cannot control how the treaty is implemented domestically.  The 
reason is simple and it is the same reason why the parol evidence rule 
exists: sovereign entities will primarily act in their own self-interest, so 
their subjective intention cannot be used to define the scope of agreements 
between themselves and other sovereigns.  
 
 
 
                                                 
113 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2..  
114 See supra note 78, § 111 cmt. h.  
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3. Analysis of Subjective Intent Is Neither Useful nor 
Appropriate 
 
The historical perspectives concerning the ultimate purposes 
behind the different prisoner transfer treaties to which the U.S. is a party 
fail to be cohesive, but they are relevant in order to illustrate why the 
subjective intent of the parties regarding the treaties’ domestic 
enforceability should not be controlling.  For all of the different political 
motivations that are cited as to why the U.S. plowed the path for 
international prisoner transfer treaties, the common denominator in all of 
these treaties is their purported purpose as defined explicitly in each 
treaty: to further the rehabilitation of the prisoner.115 
It is well-recognized that the most important reason that the U.S. 
began negotiating these types of prisoner transfer agreements was because 
of the pressure put on the State Department by relatives of Americans who 
                                                 
115 MICHAEL ABBELL, INTERNATIONAL PRISONER TRANSFER, pg. 1-9, Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. Ardsley, NJ (2002).   
See also, Guidelines for Evaluating Prisoner Applications for Transfer, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oeo/guidlines.html (last visited March 20, 2005). This is 
the official statement of the Attorney General regarding the purpose of these treaties and 
what criteria should be used in determining the eligibility for transfer.  The following 
excerpt demonstrates that the Attorney General’s interpretation of these treaties views 
social rehabilitation of the prisoner as their primary purpose: 
     (1) Likelihood of social rehabilitation.  
Beyond the practical concerns of alleviating prison crowding and dealing 
administratively with foreign national prisoners, many of whom have very limited 
English language ability, the central rationale behind transferring foreign prisoners 
to their home countries is to facilitate the prisoner's social rehabilitation.  
Rehabilitation is, of course, one of the principal purposes of incarceration in 
civilized societies.  This goal is expressly stated in the Preambles to most of the 
prisoner transfer treaties ("to provide better administration of justice by adopting 
methods furthering the offender's social rehabilitation," [Mexican treaty]; 
"facilitating [the prisoner's] successful reintegration into society," [Canadian treaty]; 
"further the ends of justice and social rehabilitation of sentenced persons," [COE 
Convention]).  Prisoner transfer assumes that such social rehabilitation is more likely 
to occur in the prisoner's home country, closer to his family and within his own 
culture.  In addition, since many foreign national prisoners will be deported when 
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were imprisoned in South and Central American countries.116 Bolivia is 
the most noteworthy in this regard. In 1977, there were 35 young 
Americans imprisoned there, held on various narcotics charges.  Many of 
these detainees had been held for years without ever being tried.117 
Relatives of these young people formed a lobby group in Washington D.C. 
and succeeded in attracting enough attention and publicity to make 
prisoner transfer rights a priority for the State Department.118 Indeed, Vice 
President Walter Mondale wrote, in a letter to the Cyrus Vance, Legal 
Advisor for the State Department at the time, “I wanted to call the case to 
your personal attention to underscore the concern to these parents and 
relatives and their hope that a solution satisfactory to all can be found as 
soon as possible.”119 
A three-man team was sent to Bolivia to investigate the situation of 
Americans being detained and possible ways to get them returned to the 
jurisdiction of the U.S.120 The team consisted of Gordon Baldwin, 
professor of law at the University of Wisconsin School of Law who was 
also working as a contractor for the State Department at the time, Sam 
Moscowitz, a foreign service officer, and Louis Fields, a State Department 
                                                                                                                         
their sentences have been served, it may not make sense to further their adjustment to 
a society in which they will not be allowed to remain after release. (emphasis added).   
116 See supra note 115 at 1-7.. 
117 Gordon B. Baldwin, Americans in Bolivian Sails, THE GARGOYLE ALUMNI BULLETIN 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL, Vol. 8 No. 4 (1977) (On file with 
Professor Gordon Baldwin Evjue-Bascom Emeritus Professor of Law, University of 
Wisconsin Law School). 
118 Conversation with Professor Gordon B. Baldwin, Evjue-Bascom Emeritus Professor 
of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School (November 18, 2002).  
119 Letter from Walter Mondale, Vice President of the U.S., to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of 
State (Feb. 11, 1977) (on file with Professor Gordon Baldwin at the University of 
Wisconsin Law School). 
120 See Baldwin, supra note 117 at 10.  
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lawyer.121 The team reported that while there was no evidence of 
American prisoners being discriminated against in any way, the lack of a 
developed prison or judicial system led to grotesque physical conditions 
and periods of detention pending trial that could be viewed as a violation 
of due process.122 As Professor Baldwin noted in a conversation with this 
article’s author, the State Department’s motivation in drafting these 
treaties was primarily to get Americans out of prisons in underdeveloped 
countries.123 At the time, he noted, there was little concern in Washington 
about the status of foreign nationals incarcerated in the U.S.124  Professor 
Detlev Vagts, who drafted and negotiated these prisoner transfer 
instruments upon Professor Baldwin’s return to the University of 
Wisconsin Law School, related the same intention of the U.S. in 
negotiating these agreements.125  Professor Vagts also added that the 
intention of the U.S. was not only to get U.S. citizens out of foreign 
prisons and back onto U.S. soil, but also to specifically negotiate these 
treaties so as to allow Americans to be furloughed upon their return to the 
U.S.126 This is ironic because, currently, the biggest concern the U.S. has 
regarding the transfer of foreign nationals back to their home country is 
the retaining the assurance that those nationals will actually serve out their 
sentences if they are returned.127 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See Conversation with Professor Gordon B. Baldwin, supra note 118.  
124 Id. 
125 Telephone conversation with Professor Detlev F. Vagts, Bemis Professor of 
International Law, Harvard Law School (Oct. 28, 2002). 
126 Id. 
127 The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Evaluating Prisoner Applications for Transfer 
demonstrates this point: 
(2)  Law enforcement concerns.  
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History does not speak to the role of rehabilitation as the primary 
purpose of our early bilateral treaties. Mexico, for example, was being 
widely criticized in the 1970’s for its negative treatment of American 
prisoners, and so it encouraged a treaty with the U.S. in order to alleviate 
the adverse effect that this bad publicity was having on its tourism.128 The 
U.S.’ treaty with Panama was necessary in order to give Panama 
jurisdiction over the prisoners in the formerly U.S. controlled Canal Zone. 
This was executed by transferring the prisoner to Panamanian custody 
rather than transfer them to a U.S. prison.129  A prisoner transfer treaty 
with Canada was convenient because of close diplomatic and law 
enforcement relations as a consequence of geographic proximity.130 
                                                                                                                         
      Social rehabilitation is not the only purpose of incarceration, and therefore 
cannot be the sole consideration in evaluating prisoner transfer requests or take 
precedence over all other objectives.  Law enforcement and justice concerns 
must also be considered, regardless of the possible consequences for the 
prisoner's social rehabilitation.  These considerations are the normal ones in any 
sentencing or parole decision: 
(e) Possible sentencing disparity.  When a prisoner is transferred, responsibility for 
administering his sentence belongs exclusively to the receiving country.  Under 
most of the bilateral treaties, the receiving country takes over the transferred 
sentence, but that sentence is then carried out under the laws and regulations of 
the receiving country, including any provisions for reduction of the term of 
confinement by parole, conditional release, good time release, or otherwise.  
Under the French and Turkish bilateral treaties and the COE Convention, the 
receiving country has the additional option of converting the sending country's 
sentence, through either a judicial or administrative procedure, into its own 
sentence; that is, the receiving country may substitute the penalty under its own 
laws for a similar offense.  (There are certain limitations on converting the 
sentence.  The receiving country is bound by the findings of facts insofar as they 
appear from the judgment, cannot convert a prison term into a fine, and cannot 
lengthen the prison term.)  However, regardless of whether the sentence is 
continued or converted, responsibility for administering it rests solely with the 
receiving state.   
See Guidelines for Evaluating Prisoner Applications for Transfer, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oeo/guidlines.html (last visited March 20, 2005). 
128 See ABBELL, supra note 115 at 1-7. 
129 Id. at 1-6. 
130 Id. at 1-7. 
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The COE Convention expressly states that furthering the 
rehabilitation prisoners was one of its primary goals.131  Due to geography, 
the European situation in regards to foreign prisoners was much different 
from that of the U.S. in the 1960’s and 1970’s. For example, in some 
European countries, more than 30% of all prisoners were foreigners.132  
The U.S. did not suffer this burden of housing such a large percentage of 
other countries’ nationals.133 Besides the obvious problem of cost, there 
are administrative difficulties that need to be addressed with foreign 
prisoners.134 A staff that speaks the language of these prisoners must be on 
hand and consideration must be given to their different cultural and dietary 
needs.135 So not only is the sentencing country taking on a financial 
burden by housing more prisoners, but those additional prisoners actually 
cost significantly more because of the additional administrative 
expenses.136   
Officials of some European countries also expressed concern about 
the treatment of foreign prisoners in European prisons.137 Their complaint 
was essentially that foreigners were generally discriminated against and so 
their life in prison was much more difficult than ordinary prison life.138 All 
                                                 
131 See supra note 2.  
132 See ABBELL, supra note 115 at 1-7. 
133 Id. It is interesting to note that the situation is quite different in the U.S. today. As of 
January 2002, about 30% of the federal inmate population was foreign nationals. About 
54% of those foreign nationals were Mexican nationals.  See id. at 10. 
134 Id. at 15. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 ABBELL, supra note 115, at 15. 
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of these problems led to the desire for a European prisoner exchange 
program of some sort, and ultimately the COE Convention.139 
In 1962, a subcommittee of the Council of Europe in the European 
Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP) began work on the European 
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal judgments in order to 
facilitate the development of an exchange program between European 
nations.140 This program is ultimately considered a failure because of 
several inadequacies, including its cumbersome complexity, its 
requirement that only the sentencing country could request a transfer, and 
the reality that the Convention could impose a transfer on a prisoner 
against his will.141 Indeed, considering the last two of these issues, it does 
not seem that the Convention had the rehabilitation of the prisoner 
foremost in mind. Rather, it appears that the Convention was more 
concerned with giving the sentencing country the right to expel an undue 
burden.  
Because very few countries ratified the treaty and very few 
prisoners were transferred under it, the problems that existed before the 
Convention existed very much after its ratification.142 Consequently, in 
1979 the ECCP considered giving a European prisoner exchange program 
another try by considering “the possibility of drawing up a model 
agreement providing for a simple procedure for the transfer of prisoners 
which could be used between member states or by member states in their 
relations with non-member states.”143 The failure of the former 
Convention and the success of the U.S. in fashioning and implementing 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1-9. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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bilateral prisoner transfer treaties with Canada and Mexico prompted the 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to invite the U.S. and Canada to act in 
an advisory role in the negotiations at COE.144 The negotiations ultimately 
led to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which was 
fundamentally modeled on the bilateral treaties of the U.S. As of 
November 24, 2002, 40 of the 43 members of the Council of Europe had 
signed the treaty into force. These countries include Australia, Bahamas, 
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
United States, and Yugoslavia.145 The success of the COE Convention 
ultimately led to the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal 
Sentences Abroad, which was opened for signature in 1993.146 As of 
November 24, 2002, this treaty was in force for Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, the United States, and 
Venezuela.147 
While it is obvious when looking at these treaties in their historical 
context that their primary motivations were political rather than 
humanitarian, the motivations of the treaty-drafters should not be 
controlling in determining the extent of the treaty’s enforceability.  The 
U.S. should not release all Americans who are returned to U.S. custody 
from Bolivia even though it was the “intent” of the U.S. when was 
drafting that bilateral treaty.  Clearly the principle of reciprocity did not 
allow the U.S. to bargain for a term that would allow the U.S. to release all 
of its nationals upon their return to native soil while simultaneously 
                                                 
144 ABBELL, supra note 115, at 1-9. 
145 See Council of Europe, List of Signatories and Ratifications for ETS Number 112, at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/112.htm. (last visited March 20, 
2005). 
146 Id. 
147 See Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-57.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2002). 
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ensuring that other parties to the treaty would honor sentences imposed on 
their nationals by the U.S.  Such a patently inequitable agreement could 
not be motivated by the principles of free contract, but more likely by 
principles of extortion and coercion.  Accordingly, the U.S. should not 
unilaterally assert its own intentions to limit the domestic enforceability of 
these international agreements. 
V. Ex Parte Young: A Tool to Compel State Compliance with 
Treaty Obligations 
 
It is necessary that U.S. courts enforce its treaty obligations under 
the COE Convention for two fundamental reasons: 1) to promote the 
rehabilitation of foreign prisoners and 2) to promote international comity 
and thereby encourage reciprocal treatment of detained American 
nationals abroad.  As demonstrated throughout this article, the U.S. has an 
express obligation to promptly inform foreign nationals of parties to the 
COE Convention of their rights under that treaty, those nationals who are 
detained in U.S. federal and state prisons have a right to be so informed.148  
No evidence currently is available that shows the federal government is in 
breach of this obligation, but the individual states that comprise this nation 
are frequent violators.  Federal courts should utilize the Ex parte Young 
doctrine to overcome state sovereign immunity and allow foreign 
nationals to seek prospective relief from state officials to ensure future 
state compliance.149 
                                                 
148 See discussion infra Part II. 
149 See Young, supra note 3, at 155-156: 
 The various authorities we have referred to furnish ample justification for the 
assertion that individuals who, as officers of the state, are clothed with some 
duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten or 
are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to 
enforce against parties an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal 
Constitution, may be enjoined by a federal court of equity from such action. 
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Suits against a state or a state official are normally barred by the 
principle of sovereign immunity, but the doctrine of Ex parte Young is the 
judicially created exception to the 11th amendment150 which is used to 
vindicate the supremacy of federal law established by the Constitution.151  
The Young doctrine dictates that while federal courts are unable to directly 
command states as states, they do have the power to “enjoin state officials 
in their official capacities.”152  The Supreme Court has mandated the use 
of a simple, two-part test to determine whether such a complaint survives 
the sovereign immunity defense: 1) there must be a violation of federal 
law, and 2) prospective relief must be sought.153 
The inadequacy of state implementing legislation is evidence of 
the failure of the U.S. states to comply with the terms of the treaties.  
Though the rights created under the COE convention and other prisoner 
transfer treaties are clearly self-executing in nature, federal and state-
implementing legislation has been enacted to provide the necessary 
statutory machinery to carry out the obligations under these treaties and 
their deficiency serves as additional evidence of state non-compliance.  
With few exceptions, they are skeletal in substance and clearly fail to 
                                                                                                                         
This doctrine has since been expanded to include all federal law, not just federal 
constitutional law.  See Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 122 
S. Ct. 1753, 1760 (2002). 
150 U.S. CONST. amend XI: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
state.”  
151 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
152 See Hutto v. Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2573. (1978).  
153 See Verizon, supra note 149, at 1760: “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex 
parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 
‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of 
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” (quoting Idaho v. 
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)). 
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address the prisoner’s right to notification.154  One commentator has noted 
that “simply put, many of the U.S. states’ [implementing] legislation does 
not encourage or actively facilitate the transfer of prisoners under the 
transfer treaties….[t]he failure to notify eligible prisoners of the possibility 
of transfer contravenes the transfer treaties.” 155  Currently, only five states 
have implementing legislation that requires correctional officers to inform 
foreign nationals of their right to transfer.156  Also recall that the 1997 
declaration of the U.S. to the COE Convention concedes that: “there are 
                                                 
154 Wyoming’s transfer statute is a good example of a typical state statute: 
7-13-106. Transfer of citizen or national of foreign country.   
The governor may act on behalf of the state to consent to the transfer of a citizen 
or national of a foreign country pursuant to a treaty between the United States 
and the foreign country of which the person is a citizen or national.”  See WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-13-106. 
In contrast, New Jersey law provides extensive guidelines on the authority of the state to 
authorize transfer and the prisoner’s eligibility therein, but nowhere obligates correctional 
authorities to notify a prisoner of their right to transfer. See Subchapter 6, Subtitle 5B 
International Transfers, Chapter 7D Prisoner Transfer Treaties, Subchapter 6, 
International Transfers 10A:10-6.1 – 10A:10-6.9. 
To see most of the state implementing legislation that exists, visit Individual State 
Prisoner Statutes, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oeo/prisonert.htm, (last visited March 
20, 2005). 
155 See Finkelstein, supra note 59, at 153. 
156 Those states are Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.073 (1994), see also 
Kentucky Corrections, Policies and Procedures, International Transfer of Inmates, Policy 
number 18.18 § V.A. (1995); Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 578 § 97B 
(1985), see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 103, § 462.07 (1985); New York, see N.Y. 
CORRECT.LAW 71 (1-a); Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.350 (1985), see also 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-67-025; and California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 2912 (West 
Supp. 1997).  The Washington Administrative Code section 137-67-025, entitled “initial 
notification” provides for timely notification of inmates: 
At the time of admission to the Washington corrections center, or the Purdy 
corrections center for women, the orientation information given to all inmates 
will include information on international offender transfers. An inmate who is a 
citizen of a treaty nation will be informed of the existing treaty and be provided 
with the opportunity to indicate an interest or non interest [sic] in a transfer to 
the inmate's country of origin or citizenship on an application form provided by 
the department. Whenever possible, the form will be bilingual or translated into 
the inmate's native language.  The application will be processed consistent with 
the purpose and provisions of the applicable treaty  
(emphasis added). 
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some states which authorize few, or no, transfers notwithstanding the 
statutory authority to consent.”157 
The obligation to inform foreign national detainees is absolutely 
necessary in order for the treaty to achieve its express goal of promoting 
rehabilitation and for the same reason that the U.S. is obligated to inform 
foreign nationals of their right to consular access under the VCCR: the 
detainee must be aware of his rights in order to exercise them.  To put this 
in perspective, the reader must imagine the typical situation of a foreign 
national arrestee who is eligible for transfer.  The detainee is are likely to 
be completely ignorant of international legal norms, rights to consular 
access, and the other mechanisms that nations have constructed to 
encourage international comity and the development of basic human 
rights.  He was probably raised in an economically depressed country with 
little or no education, but out of desperation decided to try his luck 
working in a more affluent nation, but with no intention of permanent 
immigration.  The people most important to him probably remained in his 
native country.  It is very typical for husbands to leave their wives and 
children for months or years at a time, returning home after they have 
accumulated however much money they were able to save.  Of course, 
these circumstances do not justify the commission of whatever felony 
ultimately causes that person to be arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 
prison, but the prisoner transfer treaties were drafted with the 
understanding that civilized nations strive to rehabilitate prisoners,158 and 
                                                 
157 See supra note 61, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=
30/01/05&CL=ENG&VL=1. 
158 See COE Convention, supra note 2see also Mission Statement of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons, which reads: “It is the mission of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to protect 
society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and community-
based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure, and that 
provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming 
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that this goal is seriously undermined if someone is forced to remain 
incarcerated while completely removed from a familiar society. It is also 
important to remember that only prisoners with low culpability are likely 
candidates for transfer, and they are the best candidates for rehabilitation. 
Prisoners are more likely to facilitate their own rehabilitation and social 
reintegration if they have a tangible motivation to do so, i.e., they are near 
to the people who care for them in a familiar culture. One can imagine the 
terminal negative impact that 10 years in prison would have if one could 
not effectively communicate and did not have a single visitor during that 
time.   
These are the problems that the COE Convention and other 
international prisoner transfer treaties seek to ameliorate, but they cannot 
be effective unless the individuals that the treaties are designed to benefit 
are aware of them.  That is why these treaties create an obligation for the 
sending State to promptly inform the national of his or her rights pursuant 
to their terms, and consequently, why it is so important that domestic 
courts see to it that those rights are protected.  Ex Parte Young is the tool 
that district courts should use to accomplish this.159 
 A foreign national of a member country to the COE Convention, 
who was not notified of their right to apply for a transfer back to their 
home country, has clearly suffered an injury in violation of federal law 
and therefore satisfies the first prong of the test.  The detainee would be 
precluded from retrospective relief, such as money damages, but money 
damages do not seem to be an appropriate remedy in this context 
irrespective of that limitation.  Money damages are inappropriate because 
it fails 1) to further the rehabilitation of the prisoner, and 2) promote 
                                                                                                                         
law-abiding citizens”, at http://www.bop.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
159 See supra note 149.  
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international comity.  The specifics concerning the type of provisional 
remedy sought and precisely which state officials could be brought as 
defendants are more complex issues of domestic civil litigation and thus 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 It should be noted, however, that the Young doctrine has been 
interpreted to give the courts a great deal of power to penalize the states 
for failure to comply with federal law.160  If a foreign national was 
successful in securing some type of prospective relief that sought to bring 
the state in compliance with the terms of the COE Convention, but the 
state continued to be deficient, the federal court could impose large 
financial penalties or even hold the state in contempt.161  This would 
undoubtedly be viewed as a bold assertion of judicial power, but its 
impetus would be nothing more than the application of the most ordinary 
meaning of the Constitution and U.S. treaty obligations taken together, 
and such an application should be seized upon if the opportunity is 
presented.  As Justice Harlan noted in Chew Hong v. United States 
“[a]side from the duty imposed by the Constitution to respect treaty 
stipulations when they become the subject of judicial proceedings, … the 
honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in 
                                                 
160 See Hutto, supra note 152, at 2573-74. 
161 See id.  The strength of the court’s language tells of no ambiguity: 
The present case requires application of that principle. In exercising their 
prospective powers under Ex parte Young and Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts 
are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping for 
compliance. Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Many of the court's 
most effective enforcement weapons involve financial penalties. If a state agency 
refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial penalty may be the most effective 
means of insuring compliance. The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce their decrees 
only by sending high state officials to jail.  The less intrusive power to impose a 
fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court's power to impose 
injunctive relief (emphasis in original). 
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every inquiry whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be 
recognized and protected.”162 
Of course, the current Supreme Court may not allow the federal 
courts to undermine federalism in this manner ostensibly.  Such a position 
would be unfortunate, for while the author is a proponent of the federalist 
structure of the U.S. government and the importance of the protections 
that this divided republic ensures individual liberty, he does not believe 
that the Constitution allows the states to diminish the ability of the U.S. to 
effectively manage its foreign relations.  The reluctance of domestic courts 
to enforce U.S. treaty obligation per se undermines the ability of the courts 
to enforce the power of the Executive and the Senate to effectively 
manage our foreign relations while the frequency of state governments 
engaging directly in foreign affairs is increasing.163  This problem is 
severely exacerbated by the increasing perception that the U.S. does not 
respect the rule of international law. The principles of international comity 
and the desire for reciprocal treatment of U.S. citizens abroad should 
encourage domestic courts to enforce treaty obligations in order to help 
diminish these problems.   
Many commentators have addressed the problem of foreign 
distrust of the United States and the problems that it could pose for 
American citizens abroad and the rule of international law generally.  
Samuel Berger, former National Security Adviser to President Clinton, 
summarizes the issue: 
…when our goals are embodied in binding agreements, we 
can gain international support in enforcing them when they 
are violated.  By the same token, nothing undermines U.S. 
authority more than the perception that the United States 
                                                 
162 112 U.S. at 540 (1884). 
163 See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 821 (October, 1989). 
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considers itself too powerful to be bound by the norms we 
preach to others.164 
 
Professor Detlev Vagts noted in a 2001 article that recent treaty 
controversies have been provoking “serious resentment abroad,” and 
further noted that “…the executive, Congress, the courts, and influential 
commentators have each conspicuously verbalized the idea… that the 
binding effect of international law carries little weight. This attitude, at a 
time when many foreigners distrust the United States as too powerful and 
too aware of that power, jeopardizes the conduct of our foreign affairs.”165 
Surely what is most disturbing about Prof. Vagts’ comment is that 
it was made before the Bush administration’s unilateral initiative to attack 
Iraq with or without the consent of the U.N. Security Council.166  The U.S. 
is setting a poor example as the only remaining superpower in the world, 
for if other nations cannot rely on the U.S. to respect international law as 
binding then it is unlikely that other nations are going to honor the claims 
of the U.S. when it is invoked by the U.S.  It has taken human civilization 
a very long time to come to Article 2, paragraph 4 incorporated into an 
internationally “binding” agreement such as the UN Charter, which is why 
                                                 
164 Samuel R. Berger, Foreign Policy for a Democratic President, 83 No. 3 FOR. AFF. 47, 
52 (May/June 2004).  
 
165 See Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach. 95 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 313, 313, 329-330 (April, 2001). Professor Vagts specifically noted that 
the first case brought before the ICJ where the U.S. had executed a foreign national who 
had not been notified of his right to consular access provoked serious resentment abroad. 
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Nov. 
10) (case removed from the court’s list at the request of Paraquay). 
166 See Neil MacFarquar with Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq Issues U.N. Demands and Destroys 
More Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2003, International:  “Both at the United Nations 
and in Washington, diplomats and Bush administration officials expressed growing 
concern that if the United States called for a vote on the resolution and lost it, the 
coalition led by the United States and Britain would go to war in apparent defiance of the 
Security Council.”  In light of this recent controversy, it seems appropriate to point out 
that one of the failures by the U.S. to implement a treaty that Professor Vagts points out 
in his article is the U.S.’s arrears on U.N. dues.  See supra note 165. 
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the Charter, like all other international obligations, should be given legally 
binding effect.167  As another commentator noted in a 1998 article 
commenting on the failure of the U.S. to enforce its treaty obligations 
under the VCCR in Breard: “…the Executive can also be far more vigilant 
in seeking compliance with the [VCCR].  Its claims before our courts 
portend miserable representation of U.S. citizens abroad.”168 
Because the states are “major sources of treaty violations,”169 the 
proper exercise of judicial power to assert the supremacy of federal law 
over the states inherent in our treaty obligations would serve to increase 
international comity and reciprocal treatment of Americans abroad.  
Surely this type of authority would serve to ultimately ensure, at the very 
least, that states would adopt policies and procedures commensurate with 
the nation’s treaty obligations.  Perhaps, even more importantly, it would 
encourage U.S. treaty drafters to take more care in drafting treaty 
obligations.  This solution is ideal because the U.S. would be improving 
its foreign relations by both its internal and external procedures. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States has provoked serious resentment abroad because 
the federal courts have been unwilling to enforce the unambiguous terms 
of U.S. treaty obligations on the States even though the Constitution and 
current international legal norms clearly mandate the authority and 
responsibility to do so.  Domestic courts have created obstacles to 
enforcement of treaty-based rights in order to avoid the uncertainty 
inherent in interpreting international law and to protect the federalist 
                                                 
167 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” 
168 Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights under the Consular Convention, 92 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 691, 697 (October, 1998) (emphasis added). 
169 See Vagts, supra note 165, at 330-331. 
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structure of our republic where no such protection is needed or was 
intended.  This problem has been recently exacerbated by assertions of 
unilateral authority by the executive branch in violation of our UN Charter 
obligations.  Federal courts should use the opportunity to assert federal 
supremacy in the area of foreign relations by clearly defining its 
boundaries within constitutional limits.  This approach to treaty 
interpretation would not damage either sphere of sovereignty, but rather it 
would promote the ability of the United States to effectively manage its 
foreign affairs by limiting the ability of the States to breach our 
international compacts, which is a power they were never intended to 
have.  This could ameliorate some of the damage done to our international 
reputation in recent years, but time is running short.  The United States not 
only needs to assert the ability to speak with one voice, but we need to 
ensure that this voice speaks in support of the rule of law. 
